Bananas and the resulting relationship between North America and Central America has had a dramatic impact on Honduras. Its helpful to understand some of this past in the context of Honduras’ interest in developing model cities. Building and encouraging mutual respect was not part of the language of the relationship. Loving and respecting our neighbours to the south was not our priority.
According to the book, the banana production began before the turn of the 19th century when a man named Minor Keith worked to develop railways, first in Costa Rica, then in other Central American countries.
“Keith would continue building railroads – and continue financing them with lopsided land-for-track deals – throughout Central and South America, and opening plantations in Panama, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Columbia and Equador” p 60
“There was a clear sense of manifest destiny in the building of the banana empire. It was both part of, and sometimes, the cause of increasing assertion of control over Latin America by the United States..Over the next thirty-five years (from 1898), the U.S. military intervened in Latin America twenty-eight tims: in Mexico, in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba in the Caribbean; and in Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador in Central America…the biggest consequence of those incursions was to make the region safe for bananas” p 63.
“The workers had no such voice. Though the banana moguls exhibited some altruism, building hospitals and schools for their workers, the notion that the fruit companies were an unqualified benefit to the countries they controlled – as was frequently claimed – was surely disputable. The public knew little about events like the 1912 invasion of Honduras, which granted United Fruit broad rights to build railroads and grow bananas in the country…They weren’t aware that in 1918 alone, U.S. military forces put down banana worker’s strikes in Panama, Columbia, and Guatemala.” p 64.
“To the public, the banana companies were’t just smart or altruistic, they were heroic entities that uplifted every region they entered. A New York Times article published in 1924 implied that the reign of United Fruit would be remembered as a pinnacle of human achievement. The story, headlined “Lowly Banana Rebuilds an Empire” describes the presence of U.S. enterprises in Central America as “the rehabilitation of an ancient empire..that flourished long before Columbus” The story continued: “The opening up of the humid lowlands of Central America by the new seaports, railroads, and banana plantations of the United Fruit Company is more than a story of business faith and commercial enterprise. It is a demonstration of empire building with a new ingredient capable of correcting the mistakes of the past.” p 69
“Life expectancies for banana laborers were decreasing, while United Fruit’s contol over every facet of life in the region was reaching near total levels. The company rewarded those who cooperated, and began to behave with more and more brutality toward those who didn’t. There was one clear way to distinguish between those who benefited from the company’s growth and those who didn’t. The lucky ones nicknamed the company mamita. Those who weren’t so fortunate called it El Pulpo.” p 70.
“Honduras was in debt, and the American secretary of state, Philander C. Knox, was working to have J.P. Morgan and Company take over the Honduras customs service. The scheme would have allowed any tariffs or duties collected in the Central American nation to be directly funneled to the U.S. bank…Today, Honduras is one of the poorest and least visited countries in Central America; the countryside remains sleepy, and the banana plantations seem little changed from how they must have looked a century ago. The Honduras that Zemurray (president of Cuyamel Fruit starting around 1910) grew.his first bananas in was more like a free-for-all. With no extradition treaty to the United States, the country became a haven for “people on the run.” p 72.
“The country and much of the region was also filled with mercenaries – usually from the United States – who acted as police, militiamen, and enforcers; they’d played a huge part in the frequently violent relationship between the United States and Central America in the nineteenth century….Zemurray (president of Cyamel Fruit)…employed two of the most legendary of these Central American filibusters: Lee Christmas and Guy “Machine Gun” Molony. The thirty seven year old Christmas had lived in Honduras for several years. He’d worked as an engineer on the banana railroads – he’d been fired from a similar job in the United States because he was color blind and couldn’t read the signals on the tracks – and happily jumped inot an insurrection when a battle between government forces and rebels suddenly erupted around his train. Christmas already had grievances with Honduran officialdome, so he threw his lot in with the insurgents, acquitting himself by killing several soldiers and ending up as one of the region’s most feared fixers – available and well used in multiple exploits and escapades..” p 73.
“In the context of over half a century of American adventures in Central America, what Zemurray planned might have seemed commonplace, but it remains one of the most audacious escapades of the era. According to his United Fruit Historical Society biography, Zemurray and the two mercenaries met at a New Orleans bawdy house. While the Secret Service agents monitored the brothel’s front door, the three men slipped out the back, making their way to a waiting boat. Laden with ammunition, the conspirators sailed south. On their arrival in Honduras, the trio – who’d also brought along former Honduran president Manual Bonilla, who Zermurray had recruited for the plot – drummed up supporters and mounted an insurrection. Six weeks later, Bonilla was again in control of the country. One of his first acts was to sign a bill that allowed Zemurray to operate, tax free, across a broad portion of the nation.” p 74.
“American soldiers were stationed on its (United Fruit) behalf as police officers in Panama in 1918 and as union busters in Guatemala – where it was granted a hundred kilometer wide ministate two years later. Troops were twice called on to “monitor” elections in Honduras and returned to Panama in 1925 to break up a plantation strike.” p 75
“In 1925, Popenoe (a research scientist with experience in the tropics) was hired by United Fruit to open a research station in Lancetilla, a few miles from the company’s Honduran headquarters in Tela. It was a curious job for someone who’d expressed so much sympathy for the exploited, but the scientist was determined that his work could aid people working at both the highest and the lowest levels of the banana industry….the self-made plant expert was charged with a secondary task: determining what crops might be grown on land ruined by Panama disease – or even in the entire region if bananas completely vanished. His proposed replacement crops included rubber, a dozen kinds of timber, the oil palm, and cocoa, all of which are grown across wide stretches of Central America….when Sam Zemurray wanted to curry favor with Honduran president Tiburcio Carias Andino, he ordered Popenoe to develop a local breed of tobacco that could compete with product from Cuba. For bananas, Popenoe helped create an even more controversial legacy: It is called Bordeaux mixture (the conconction of chemicals used to control Panama disease)” p 104
“United Fruit woudl still exert significant control over many of these countries, especially Honduras, but as the McCarthy era ended and the hottest spots of the cold war moved to Southeast Asia, small signs of independence – legislation that increased worker’s rights and even the creation of some independent banana producers emerged. (None of this meant peace for Central America, however, where civil wars, dictatorships, and right-wing governments, propped by the U.S., were the norm through the 1980s).” p 143
“Vaccaro’s enterprise (Vacarro Brothers and Company) became the largest banana grower in northern Honduras (in 1899), centered around the port city of La Ceiba. Vacarro’s enterprise quickly became a scaled-down version of United Fruit, building seaports, railroads, and communications facilities. Vacarro copied another United Fruit tactic as well: using control over growing areas. In order to gain working capital for railroad building, Vacarro enlisted the help of local merchants, who excited by the banana gold rush, put up both cash and their land in return for shares in the newly formed Vacarro Brothers and Company. By 1903 the company was earning huge profits, and the investors began to demand their rightful portion. Instead, according to Honduran author Antonio Canelas, writing in La Ceiba, sus raices y su historia (La Ceiba, its Roots and its History), Vacarro ordered the town’s city hall to be burned down, along with any records of land ownership and business agreements contained inside. With the support of the Honduran government, the banana importer was able to make a blank slate of the region – over which he took control.” p 145 (In 1925, this company became Standard Fruit).
“Starting in the late 1970s, Freedom of Information Act requests revealed thousands of pages of U.S. government papers, including budgets for the operation, intelligence operatives, United Fruit executives, and conspirators in Central America. One document lists over fifty Guatemalan officials targeted for “elimination”. A second contains instructions on how to accomplish that goal, in handbook form.” p 155
“United Fruit lauched the attack on Jacob Arbenz (Guatemalan president accused of communistic sympathies) from Honduras in 1954. But that country was at that time embroiled in its own banana conflict. A month after the soon to be deposed Guatemalan leader presented United Fruit with a tax bill, a few dozen Honduran workers walked off the job. By the end of the month, the nation’s entire banana industry was frozen in place: thirty thousand workers refused to enter the plantations, loading docks, and railroad depots. The Honduran economy, never strong, was on the verge of collapse, and the banana exporters, already in a state of panic over Guatemala, were terrified that the strikers would succeed and that one Central American country after another would then fall….United Fruit acted first in Guatemala because it was easier to stage an overthrow in a country without strikers than to attack thousands of angry, idled laborers. But the company also knew that success against Arbenz would shift momentum away from the envisioned chain reaction. That is exactly what happened. When the Guatemalan government folded, the morale of the Honduran strikers collapsed, and the country’s government was able to arrest labor leaders by accusing them of having ties to Arbenz.” p 166
“Villeda Morales had also won the 1954 vote, but he’d been denied office, partly because he’d been seen as too left wing. The Honduran…worked as a rural doctor before going into politics – understood the injustices that Honduran peasants had been subjected to for decades. And like the failed Guatemalan, the new Honduran president understood that the key to change was land reform. The Honduran program was strategically modest…small plantations and communities were allowed to form rural cooperatives adn labor laws were reformed to allow security and increased protection for workers. The softer approach didn’t result in immediate disaster, but, by 1963, when it appeared Villeda Morales woudl be reeelected by a large margin, and anticipating even more sweeping reforms, the country’s military stepped in again: Elections were cancelled, Villeda Morales was exiled, and Colonel Oswaldo Lopez Arellano took power. Many of the earlier land reforms were rolled back, and even the United States – which was beginning to feel uneasy about intervening for the banana companies – officially suspended diplomatic relations during the coup. The country’s new leader purged perceived leftists, especially those with ties to Cuba’s Fidel Castro (this pleased the United States, which restored diplomatic relations, with increased military assistance, a year later. For those laboring on Honduran plantations, the coup marked the beginning of decades where gains were lost, gained, and lost again. Some unions were banned and others grew. Land was transferred to workers, then given away. The one taboo was strikes: As recently as 1991, the military was killing workers who walked off the job. p 168.
“In 1972 a new form of Sigatoka (banana disease) hit Honduras…to combat Black Sigatoka, which remains the most widespread banana disease in the world, aerial spraying of the crop was increased, resulting in further damage to the health of the workers on the ground….in other words, though the actors, techniques, and storyline shifted constantly, Honduras remained the quintessential banana republic”. p 169.
We all in North America share responsibility for what happened in Honduras. It resulted from our insatiable desire for bananas. It resulted from our ability to separate moral responsibility to our neighbours to the south from our financial investments in corporations that fed our desires. It resulted from our willful ignorance of how our own people and our own elected leaders were treating our neighbours to the south. May God and the people of Honduras forgive us for that, and may we become better global citizens.